The total unfinished: the act as a cell of person About G. Cusinato, The full incomplete. Philosophical anthropology and ontology of the person, FrancoAngeli Milan 2008, II ed. 2010, p. 336. The person is the ontological entity capable of being born a second time thanks exemplarity. The act is a step, a block in the process of establishing personal identity. In this way the first time a person is born psychic acts and metabolizing functions differs from VAT, but is born a second time to the extent that co-running acts metabolized. In the first case, the act is the culmination, in the second is the starting point.
Tests on-line book:
1) http://mondodomani.org/dialegesthai/vv01.htm
2) http://www.recensionifilosofiche.it/crono/2010-01/cusinato.htm
3) http://www.scienzaefilosofia.it/Recensioni_2123957.html
4) http://www.phenomenologylab.eu/index.php/2009/08/sistemi-autopoietici-e-persone/
Recensioni su rivista:
A. Vigorelli: in: «Rivista di Storia della Filosofia» 3/2009, pp. 646-648
Ampie sintesi del volume sono rintracciabili sulle seguenti riviste online:
to an oversight in the first reissue (2010) has not been reported to alter the 'Introduction
. Here is the version of 2010:
What is a person? How effectively is the personal identity? What is the relationship between personal identity and psychological identity? There is coincidence between the person and homo sapiens? The person is still, despite everything, the center of the debate philosophical, sociological, legal and bioethics, eppure la dimensione ontologica della persona, immersa in un’ambiguità di fondo [1] , sembra sfuggire continuamente alle reti concettuali costruite dalle più svariate teorie.
Per affrontare questi problemi propongo un’ontologia della persona come compimento dell’antropologia filosofica. L’antropologia filosofica nasce nella Germania degli anni Venti in un periodo “fluido” in cui l’eclissi delle tradizionali concezioni dell’uomo non aveva ancora lasciato il posto alla cristallizzazione totalitaria dell’uomo di massa che si sarebbe imposta negli anni Trenta. Mai prima d’ora, poteva ancora affermare Max Scheler nel 1926, l’uomo è risultato così drammaticamente enigmatico a se stesso, eppure tale epoca è anche la prima in cui l’uomo, socraticamente, sa di non sapere chi è. L’antropologia filosofica era dunque originariamente vissuta come una grande occasione per relativizzare tutti i tentativi volti a consegnare l’uomo a una definizione fissa, restituendo così l’enigmaticità dell’uomo in tutta la sua complessità. Sempre nel 1926, Scheler osserva che l’enorme mole di dati raccolti dalle scienze biologiche, dalla fisiologia, dalla medicina e dalla psicologia hanno reso l’uomo, se possibile, ancora più misterioso a se stesso: more know the man as an object of specialized disciplines, let alone understand it in its entirety.
is to understand the enigma of man, but from a category of nature and life that no longer coincides with that of positivist science. Heidegger initially followed a different path, starting from a Dasein in many ways unthinkable only strictly within the confines of the German language, and that, by the ontological question first, while the naked man the size of the body, eroticism, 's individual uniqueness, openness the world, but with no guarantee of being able to properly recover in later steps.
In posing the question in reference to the category of human life , philosophical anthropology is not caught in the biological, thereby forgetting the ontological difference, but rather seeks to encompass concretely from the Act, decisive of overcoming the effects of closure von Uexkull, which are later Heidegger himself pay much attention. Hence the importance of investigating, better than we have done so far, the roots of philosophical debate in which the concept of self-organization, brilliantly developed by Kant in the Critique of Judgement , comes to the theory of the organism as Schelling 'scheme of liberty "and the theory of Stufenfolge of self (or" centered ") of the various living systems. Issues that cross even Scheler and philosophical anthropology of Plessner and branching in the direction of the new systems theory, the one with Maturana and Varela define the body in the autopoietic sense. Dealing with these results is to ask if the man himself whether or not an autopoietic system.
philosophical anthropology of the twentieth century attempted to define man in reference to a biological instability that leads him to transform his body (the theory of cybor Alsberg) or your environment (Gehlen). But what if the man was being characterized by giving birth to a new form of existence? How else to understand the transition from Centrica - which characterizes the biological sphere (including the I subject of rational consciousness) - the ex-centricity of the person? How else to understand the relationship between Nietzsche's Dionysian excess el'eccedenza agape Scheler? While the surplus Dionysian still gives shape to the imagination of the subject, the excess agapic is irreducible to a projective scheme and is already anticipating a time to make room, a center staff, the emergence of a new positive (see p. 206). The surplus agapic is presented as a case example of creativity.
Against this background Scheler's philosophical anthropology looks too unbalanced on the concept of spirit (Geist ), with the result of being perceived as a metaphysical prominence and theomorphic. Of course it is of interpretations of convenience, but at the base of my work there is also the belief that it is no longer enough merely to correct and improve anthropology filosofica del Geist . Più promettenti sono eventualmente le riflessioni di Scheler sui concetti di Vorbild (guida) e di Bildung (formazione). È attraverso una nuova antropologia filosofica della Bildung che sarà possibile cogliere il problema della persona come l’essere che, essendo privo di un’essenza predefinita, è costretto a formarsi e quindi a nascere una seconda volta.
Ciò che si sta verificando nell’attuale società, immersa nella liquidità postmoderna, è proprio un arresto di tale processo di formazione: qui l’uomo ritorna indietro e assolutizza la propria fissità autoreferenziale. Da questa position of self-sufficiency follows that lack of restraint - thus increasing the gap between awareness of its limitations and technical means available - that characterizes the choices of modern man. Some forms of genetic engineering and the application of neuromarketing the manipulation of public opinion become so comfortable alternative to the difficult process of shaping the individual. If man is being born as all incomplete, the danger is that in the absence of adequate space for training, the task of shaping it is taken by someone else: yesterday and today the ascetic ideal breeding mass media. If this is the threat, then the philosophical anthropology should be rethought in the direction of the formation of the layers of emotional person (see pp. 103-120), perhaps also exploring possible convergences with the issues raised by the care Pierre Hadot or Foucault's technologies of the self last.
Why " ontology of the person" and not simply " phenomenology of the person"? The problem is that from Locke to the bioethics of Singer and Engelhardt has dominated a general lack of distinction between I and person. Un'indistinzione that a all'atrofizzazione side is functional in the process of training, the other proposes ostracizzante a barrier between people and not people. For this is not possible from a simple description of how you give the person in the common, but it is necessary to identify a strong argument that can give account of how a person is ontologically constitutes a different ego.
The proposal is to start from the relationship between place and person: the acts are the "cells" metabolized by ' ordo amoris the person. The person metabolizes the psychic functions in acts, but also in relating to their acts will inaugurate something ontologically unexpected and distinguishes the person from all other entities: it reveals an entity ontologically innovative that creates a new form of existence. Every act is a piece of the path traced by the rebirth of becoming-person. This is because the act does not run (as is the case for action or mental function), but precisely co-run. In other words, in co-running the person acts autopoietically self-organizing, but organizing them " partnership" [2] . In partnership
la persona si svela una totalità incompiuta che, in quanto tale, ha bisogno d’inaugurare un processo formativo facendosi contagiare dall’ esemplarità . Nell’esemplarità altrui è individuabile la matrice generativa di un processo formativo particolarmente riuscito, quindi di un’esperienza nuova che posso creativamente fare anche mia (cfr. p. 208). Incompiutezza ed esemplarità sono ciò che differenzia la persona dall’Io. Dietro la persona non c’è un’essenza compiuta, ma un moto espressivo, cioè una matrice generativa del percorso ontologico con cui una determinata persona è riuscita a esprimersi nell’atto (See the "principle of expressiveness " ). L 'essence' the person is perfect in so far is incomplete. The incompleteness, far from being a failure, it indicates the ability to maintain an open space before. The person is an "unfinished totality" which derives its perfection always being open to further possible completion of partnership (see "identity principle partnership"). An essence
task would instead lived by the person as a cage or a static barrier. To the extent that the person is positioned over as "all done" severs all relations with the size and partnership approach lies in the logic of self-centered. The person is ultimately a great riconvertitore energy psychic energy in fostering partnership and then groped a key resource for you to set a new way of resolving conflicts and in their nature, once the logic centric has come to an end.
If I forget everything, just the moment when I refer to the person I am now trying to trace a discrimination against the non-person, falling even legal opposition between person and thing. An opposition is unacceptable, not only because the corporate limits of the law from time to time are historically changeable and uncertain, especially because it goes against the very meaning of the person who is not to centralize rights, as well as fostering partnership to promote itself, Recognizing, as no-thing all that surrounds it, and then developing an ethic of responsibility towards other living beings and nature.
[1] This ambiguity is already present in the greek word etymologically " prosopon " indicating the first "face" of the individual, but also the "mask" of the actor play. The latter becomes prominent in the Latin word meaning "person . However we must not forget that in the Christian tradition also shows a different sense from the discussion on the mystery of the Trinity: Augustine and Tertullian who use " person" to translate the greek hypostasis, "a substance (ousia ), three people ( hypostases ).
[2] Relations "participatory" develop within established channels referring to a "model", while "partnership" to express themselves creatively becoming infected by an "exemplary" . To use a visual metaphor is like when the light is captured by an optical fiber or when it can spread freely in the environment. I have in mind the well-known distinction between "radiation" and "enlightenment" proposed by J. Gibson (see J. Gibson, An ecological approach to perception visual , Bologna 1999, 97-104).
Further comments:
The act of the whole cell as unfinished
H. Jonas talks about body as a "surprise ontological", a new ontological entity with respect to the inorganic world. To understand how the person is an "ontological surprise" compared to the body is useful to refer to the results achieved regarding the biological sciences to the study of the organism itself, these revolve around the basic concept of metabolism. An attempt to re-think philosophically metabolism was made between the fifties and sixties by H. Jonas, but in my view is more detailed and relevant reflection undertaken on this issue later with the new systems theory of Luhmann and Maturana. The new systems theory has shown that a body is such as it is a system open to a continuous exchange with the environment. But beware: just import directly from the basic materials and energy that the closure of the operating system later in the constituent parts of the body metabolizes. No matter that the cells and "pieces parts "already structured, but you need to metabolize. In metabolize gives your organization and its "form" on a "foreign" materials, but in doing so causes a mismatch between your logic and the environment in which they live.
What happens to the person? With regard to the environment in which a person lives, that the psychic systems and functions, there is a similar process: the person in accordance with its operational closure metabolizes the psychic functions into action. To clarify the situation the act relates only to the person, a psychic I can not perform acts but just actions and tasks. But a paradox emerges here as if the person is able to distinguish themselves from their psychic environment based on its closure, similar to the body, it is also true that this operation is that the person is their identity, as is the case in the body. The person is the identity of the running, but the execution of the act is not intended to reproduce the distinction with the environment but to determine a process of trans-formation of the person in the same way partnership, namely through the exemplary nature of others. In that sense there is only operational closure against of psychic systems, but not other personal systems, the reason lies in the nature of the act: the act is in fact co- run because, unlike mental action, is always based on an intentional opening to 'otherness based on an exemplar that has the ability to correct in the sense of Um-bildung , that of shaping his life promoting the second birth.
The idea is to plug the person ontology of the concept of re-birth. The rebirth is through co-execution the act, the act is a step, a block in the process of establishing personal identity. In this way the first time a person is born psychic acts and metabolizing functions differs from VAT, but is born a second time to the extent that co-running acts metabolized. In the first case, the act is the culmination, the second is the starting point .
paragraph of the book on Paul Alsberg is reported on Alsberg: evolution non-organic and organic disengagement
Back cover
AND ALL UNFINISHED
What is the person? What is the relationship between personal identity and psychological identity? There is coincidence between the person and homo sapiens? Starting philosophical anthropology of Max Scheler and systems theory, the author defines the person as a 'whole unfinished psychic functions that metabolizes into action "means the documents are the" cells "produced by the author amoris system personnel. In this perspective, personal identity turns out to be an "identity partnership" is constituted through the unmistakable stamp with which the act cuts the plane factual.
The ontology of the person proposed by Cusinato presents itself as a "theory of compartecipatività" that one side comes out from the confines of the theory of autopoietic systems by focusing the fundamental theoretical concept of co-implementation of the act, the other involves a rethinking of the distinction between psychological and spiritual through the development of an original principle of expression ", an alternative to various forms of reductionism and spiritualism.
Index Text
Introduction .................................. .................................................. ........................... 11
Book One: Philosophical Anthropology .................................. ........................... 15
The Dionysian excess ................................... .................................................. ......... 17
1. Anthropology surplus in Nietzsche ............................................ 19
1.1. Beyond relativism: the conflict between the will to power ................ 19
1.2. Vitalism and evolution ............................................... ........................... 22
1.3. The man as "sick animal" instinct and institutions as a substitute 25
1.4. Morale e ideale ascetico............................................................................... 26
1.5. I luoghi dell’eccedenza dionisiaca........................................................... 27
1.6. Über sich hinaus............................................................................................... 28
1.7. La volontà di generare e la fecondità del bello................................... 29
2. Narcotizzazioni.................................................................................................... 32
2.1. Incuria sui: l’arte di narcotizzare il dolore.......................................... 32
2.2. Aristotele: katharsis come sedativo.......................................................... 35
2.3. Platone: katharsis e uscita dalla caverna.............................................. 37
2.4. Schopenhauer: art anesthetic ............................................ ............ 41
3. The philosophical anthropology in front all'annun-ing man's death 43
3.1. Hermeneutics of Foucault and the subject of awakening from sleep anthropocentric 43
3.2. Scheler el'eccedenza Dionysian ............................................. .................. 45
3.3. Crisis and deconstruction of anthropocentric thought .......................... 48
3.4. Dall'Übermensch Nietzsche all'Allmensch Scheler's ................ 50
3.5. The catastrophe of Germany and the theory dell'Ausgleich ................ 52
3.6. The crisis of democracy among mass opinion and exemplary. 57
objects, organisms, people: an ontology layers .............................. .... 61
4. Emerging theory of creation, ontology layers .............. 63
5. Schelling: Stufen-Folge philosophy of the organism and the nature ..... 68
5.1. Body as a "scheme of freedom "........................................... .... 68
5.2. La Stufenfolge della centricità................................................................... 72
5.3. La critica al teleologismo kantiano.......................................................... 75
5.4. Sistema e ambiente: la duplicità originaria.......................................... 76
6. Scheler: autopoiesis e strati del reale......................................................... 79
6.1. The couple shares a whole-the system-environment ....................... 79
6.2. A first test of the influence of Schelling in Berlin on 81 Scheler
6.3. Philosophy and curvature of the body being bio-psychological autopoietic 83
6.4. The retroactive nature of the sensation ............................................. ... 86
6.5. A comparison with the theories of Maturana and Luhmann's autopoietic 89
6.6. The four levels of centricity biopsychic ......................................... 97
6.7. Scheler, Plessner and Gehlen: the distinction between psychic and spiritual philosophical anthropology .................................. .................................................. ................................... 99
7. Affective education and emotional layers to the wonder .............. 103
7.1. Stratification and increased levels of emotional opening 103
7.2. From the point of view of the deeper emotional layers ....................... 109
7.3. What are the feelings ?........................................... ................. 111
7.4. Resentment and hedonism as a result of the impossibility of emotional compensation ....................................... .................................................. .............................. 113
7.5. Ehre and Furcht, what is the eye able to capture the layers of emotional life ?................................. .................................................. ................................. 116
7.6. Layers of emotional and therapeutic vocation of philosophy ................... 118
eyes eros ........................................ .................................................. ........... 121
8. Anthropology and intentionality: from Dilthey to Scheler .......................... 123
8.1. The intent of the system drive ............................................ .... 123
8.2. Psychic structure and intentionality counterfactual ........................... 125
8.3. L’intenzionalità rovesciata e la Weltoffenheit.................................. 128
9. Il corpo immaginifico..................................................................................... 130
9.1. La critica a Descartes.................................................................................. 130
9.2. Kant: l’ammutolimento del corpo dinnanzi alla legislazione intellettuale 132
9.3. From theory to that of the kinesthetic Husserl's "body schema" 134
9.4. The theory of the body and imaginative Bilder ...................................... 137
10. Animal Intelligence and the specificity of the human ...... 142
10.1. The dual nature of the tool and civilization .................. 142
10.2. Alsberg: evolution non-organic and organic disengagement ..... 143
10.3. The issues raised by the intelligence animal ................................ 147
10.4. It's hard to be a man: the unstable boundaries between human and animal 150
10.5. Critique of Scheler's theory of civilization ......................... 153
10.6. Wissenssoziologie: postindustrial or postmodern society ?.... 155
11. The revolution of eros as a culmination of the process centric .. 159
11.1. Some anthropological ideas in the Symposium and Phaedrus ................. 159
11.2. Scheler and Plato ............................................... .......................................... 164
11.3. The re-evaluation of Plato .............................................. ....................... 165
11.4. From Plato to Freud: the impotence of the spirit ............................... 166
11.5. Seidel and Gehlen: the origin of morality and institutions ........ 167
11.6. The "hollow heart": from surplus drive excess of 169 fantasy
11.7. The theory of eros relieving ............................................ ................... 170
11.8. Homo Eroticus: creating the visual world ............................... 171
Book II: Ontology of the person ................................ .................. 175
Reduction and Weltoffenheit .................................. .................................................. . 177
1. The perception of pure philosophical el'empirismo ........................................ 179
1.1. Philosophical empiricism and closing environmental ...................................... 179
1.2. Scheler and closure of environmental von Uexkull ............................. 179
1.3. Autodatità and knowledge-symbolic ............................................ ........ 182
1.4. Bergson and the problem of disinterested perception ................. 184
1.5. Besides the thought of Kant and summary ........................................... .......... 187
1.6. The material a priori in Husserl and Scheler .......................................... ... 189
1.7. Radical constructivism and direct realism of Gibson ................. 191
1.8. The delimitation of philosophical empiricism ........................................ 195
2. Surplus agape and autodatità .............................................. ..................... 198
2.1. Eros and agape: there is a demand of loving the world responds to opening up ................................. .................................................. .......... 198
2.2. Reduction and autodatità ............................................... .................................. 203
2.3. Imagination to compartecipatività .................................... 205
2.4. Ideation and intent counterfactual ............................................ 208
3. Reduction and multiple realities .............................................. ............................ 211
3.1. Reduction and Lebenswelt ............................................... ................................ 211
3.2. The bracketed reality prominent ................................ 213
3.3. Reduction as a treatment Ordo amoris ........................................... 216
4. Radicalization of the opening and ex-city-centers ................................. 218
4.1. The opening as a radical destabilization ...................................... 218
4.2. The other focus of the ellipse: the problem of the ex-centricity in Scheler Schelling and 220
4.3. Weltoffenheit and Qaumi £ zein ........................................... ................................. 223
4.4. The theory of conflict: what the spiritual ?............................... 226
5. Phenomenology of otherness .............................................. ........................... 231
5.1. Between empathy and mirror neurons ............................................. ................. 231
5.2. Robinson Crusoe ................................................ ............................................ 238
5.3. Intersubjectivity: Scheler's criticism of Husserl ............................. 241
5.4. The perception of "immediate" than the other .......................................... ........ 244
5.5. The different levels of perception of ......................................... 247
5.6. The moral of the natural sympathy and S. Francis .......................... 250
5.7. The universal grammar of expressiveness and unipatia .............. 252
5.8. Erlebnis and Ausdruck ............................................... ....................................... 254
The person partnership approach ................................... ............................................ 257
6. The problem of the person .............................................. ................................ 259
6.1. Persona e bioetica......................................................................................... 259
6.2. La critica a Locke e l’eredità kantiana................................................ 262
6.3. Scheler: persona e atto................................................................................ 264
6.4. La teoria dell’ordo amoris in Scheler................................................... 267
6.5. Oltre l’ontologia del possibile................................................................. 278
6.6. Alcune considerazioni sulla “prospettiva in prima persona” di Baker 282
7. Il principio di espressività............................................................................ 284
7.1. L’essenza e il principio di espressività................................................ 284
7.2. The two ways of expressiveness ............................................ ........................... 287
7.3. Design and cognitive metabolism .............................................. .......... 288
8. For an ontology of the person ............................................ ........................ 290
8.1. The lack of distinction between dominant psychic I and person ...................... 290
8.2. The act as a "cell" of all unfinished .............................. 291
8.3. The inoggettivabilità Act ............................................ .......................... 296
8.4. Overthrow of the psychological and rectification partnership approach 297
8.5. All as unfinished opening temporalized ........................ 299
8.6. Physiognomy of the person and break emotional .......................... 301
8.7. Person as the center of a territory empirical ................................. 302
8.8. Rupture of the hermeneutic circle and the act performative ............. 304
9. The problem of ethics and freedom located ........................................... .............. 309
9.1. The emptiness and silence promising ............................................ ................. 309
9.2. Freedom and "creativity unfinished "............................................ .............. 311
9.3. Freedom and freedom of the individual ego .......................................... ....... 314
9.4. The refutation of Ivan: freedom and radical evil ............................. 316
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